This article explores the role of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in the international response to the conflict in Darfur. Both scholars and activists have commonly described the R2P in Darfur as a failure. However, a second look reveals a relatively far-reaching response to a contemporary civil war: Darfur hosts the world's largest UN peacekeeping mission; it represents the first situation that the UN Security Council has referred to the International Criminal Court; sanctions have been imposed against Sudan; and significant resources were invested in peace negotiations. This article thus explores the puzzle of Darfur. It first establishes empirical facts by providing a detailed account of international engagement in Darfur. It then considers four conceptions of the R2P in the context of Darfur, arguing that the R2P as a 'rallying cry' for transnational advocacy groups provides the most plausible explanation for the magnitude of the international response. The third section of the article thus explores the mechanisms through which the transnational campaign on Darfur has built leverage. It concludes by considering the implications of the Darfur case on the R2P as a global norm and by pointing to some of its more problematic aspects. 
Bashir. Significant resources have also been invested in peace negotiations. In addition to the joint mediation efforts of the UN and the African Union (AU), the United States, Russia, China, the UK, France, the EU -to name just the most significant players -have appointed special envoys to Darfur forward to make sense of the R2P in Darfur and beyond: R2P versus Realpolitik; R2P as subversion; R2P as a more just world order; and R2P as social construction. Against this background, the article argues that the most plausible explanation of the response to the Darfur conflict is the emergence of a transnational advocacy movement. The R2P is relevant insofar as it served as a rallying cry for the Darfur activists. Thus, the third section of the article explores the mechanisms through which the transnational campaign on Darfur has built leverage. The conclusion considers the implications of the Darfur case on the R2P as a global norm and points to some of its more problematic aspects.
Synopsis of the international response to the Darfur conflict
The international response to the Darfur conflict developed over several stages: in the beginning of the conflict in 2002-04, when the violence reached its peak, there was almost no international reaction. A significant response only emerged in late 2004 after the general public in western countries became aware of Darfur. International engagement in Darfur gradually became more forceful as the focus shifted to robust peacekeeping, sanctions, and international criminal justice.
Absent international reaction at the outset (2002-2004)
For many years, Darfur was a marginalised region within the Sudanese state given that it was long deprived of resources for economic development and lacked political autonomy. Starting in 2000, a rebellion began to ferment, eventually leading to the escalation of violence in 2002-03. 12 The early successes of the rebels threatened the control of the Sudanese government which reacted by arming an existing militia force made up of young men from Arab, mostly nomad tribes in Northern Darfur. These forces were then unleashed, carrying out a vicious counter-insurgency campaign aimed at destroying the civilian support base of the rebels. 13 The violence reached its zenith between mid-2003 and mid-2004 resulting in the destruction of hundreds of villages of mostly non-Arab tribes, the death of over 130,000 14 and the displacement of 1.5 million Darfurians during that period. 
Darfur in the context of the Responsibility to Protect
The previous section described the international response to the Darfur conflict, which, as Mills noted, was contradictory at times. 46 The following section seeks to understand why this response occurred. For this purpose, it considers four theoretical propositions regarding the role of R2P and assesses their plausibility in the context of Darfur: R2P versus Realpolitik;
R2P as subversion; R2P as a more just world order; and R2P as a social construction.
R2P versus Realpolitik
According to a realist perspective, states intervene in far-away civil wars when material interests are at stake, for example to eliminate safe havens for terrorists or to prevent 'rogue'
states from acquiring nuclear weapons. 47 Thus, states do not get involved out of humanitarian compassion or a sense of collective responsibility and therefore, the lofty principles of R2P 
R2P as subversion
Another critical appraisal of the R2P is offered by pluralist scholars. Thus, international institutions such as the framework regulating the use of force in the UN Charter as well as the principles of sovereignty and non-interference guarantee order in the international system. These accounts point to an alternative reading of the international response to the Darfur conflict from a liberal and solidarist perspective. Thus, the world community did more in Darfur than in most previous civil wars to address the plight of affected populations:
peacekeepers with a robust mandate were deployed to offer some protection to civilians; the ICC was given a mandate to prosecute those responsible for crimes in Darfur; sanctions were imposed against the Sudanese government; much effort was put into negotiating a peace settlement; and a massive humanitarian operation was set up to secure the livelihoods of those who lost their homes in the war. In other words, the magnitude of the international reaction to the Darfur crisis could be interpreted as an imperfect, but significant step towards a new world order as outlined by the R2P doctrine. 
R2P as social construction
According to the constructivist approach, systems of shared ideas and norms constitute important vectors for states' behaviour in world politics by shaping their social identities.
However, international norms do not emerge from a vacuum, but they are 'actively built by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their community.'
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According to Finnemore, the norm of humanitarian intervention, as articulated in the R2P Wheeler argued, 'it is only through the mobilisation of intense pressures on the part of domestic publics that governments will be prepared to embark on humanitarian policies.' 73 Darfur is a case in point. The growing salience of the R2P norm is a necessary condition for states to contemplate intervention in a strategically unimportant region like Darfur. However, such intervention is not automatic, as the muted response to the recent atrocities in Sri Lanka demonstrates. Rather, it was the work of advocacy groups that put Darfur on the map.
Specific platforms were created in several countries to coordinate the advocacy efforts of a broad range of NGOs. These efforts achieved a lot of resonance due to a favourable political context, but also because the Darfur campaign was malleable to the interests of different constituencies. 74 The glue that held the different groups together was a commitment to the to two activists, the R2P principle constituted the 'intellectual underpinning' of the Darfur advocacy movement.
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The movement gained considerable leverage and its lobbying was an important factor in generating international action in Darfur, as exemplified by the involvement of the ICC, EUFOR, and UNAMID. This claim is corroborated by the fact that the international response only materialised after the movement became operational. Furthermore, the states in which the Darfur advocates were most influential, namely the US, the UK and France, have shown the most significant response, even as they resisted calls to intervene militarily. Robert rallying cry around which the interests of a diverse set of advocacy groups could converge and which served as a mobilising device. However, several questions remain unanswered:
Why was the R2P as a rallying cry more effective in Darfur than elsewhere? And how has the Darfur advocacy movement achieved exceptional resonance in public opinion and among policy makers? To tackle these questions, the following section considers three mechanisms derived from the literature on transnational advocacy movements through which activists created political will for engagement in Darfur: creating frames, grafting and invoking analogies.
Creating frames
The most important factor of salience, both in public opinion and among decision makers is The creation of cognitive frames to raise awareness about an issue is a common strategy employed by transnational advocacy networks. 80 Frames make issues comprehensible to external audiences and they encourage collective action. 81 Thus, according to Snow and Benford, the more a frame is coherent internally and the more it fits the broader political culture, the greater is the 'frame resonance'. 82 The Enshrined in the 1948 Genocide Convention, which defines genocide as acts committed with the intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, this norm stipulates that states have a duty to prevent the commission of genocide as well as to punish its perpetrators.
Thus, anti-genocide and R2P norms are natural allies since they both prescribe action to stop atrocities that constitute genocide. In the case of Darfur, a link between the two norms was created by framing the conflict as genocide. What does Darfur tell us about the current state of the R2P? First, compared to other civil wars, the international response to the Darfur conflict constitutes a relatively ambitious implementation of the R2P doctrine. One conclusion, therefore, is that the R2P is no longer purely aspirational, but has gained practical relevance. Second, Darfur shows that the function of the R2P as a rallying cry for transnational activism has potential. Thus, the R2P's normative content appears to be at least as significant as the very broad policy platform that it sets out. Considering these two factors, why is the R2P in Darfur so commonly described as a failure? One explanation is the R2P has not yet emancipated itself from the idea of military humanitarian intervention, despite affirmations to the contrary by advocates and policy makers. Many of them remain stuck in a logic that considers anything less than NATO's intervention in Kosovo as failure, even though the R2P doctrine actually emphasises nonmilitary instruments of conflict prevention.
Another reason is that Darfur is not, evidently, a success for the R2P. The international community only started paying attention to the Darfur conflict when the majority of the atrocities had already happened. Moreover, the interventions that did take place failed to significantly improve the situation of Darfurians on the ground. Humanitarian access has improved and the presence of international actors presumably has a certain deterrence effect, but there is no doubt that civilians in Darfur remain intensely vulnerable. It is easy to blame these failures on the lack of "political will" to intervene more forcefully. Less convenient is the realisation that the R2P doctrine itself, and the different interventions it inspired, had
